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N “THE NORMATIVITY OF INSTRUMENTAL REASON,” 
Christine Korsgaard presents a problem for those who accept similarly 
structured Humean views of  both action and rationality.1 (I will call the 
conjunction of  views she criticizes the double-Humean view.) Korsgaard 
contends that the double-Humean view implies the impossibility of  irrational 
action, as it claims that we can only perform the actions that it deems 
rational. First I will develop Humean views of  rationality and action so as to 
display the force of  Korsgaard’s objection. Then I will respond by showing 
how double-Humeans can develop their view to account for just as much 
practical irrationality as there is. 
Double-Humeans can answer Korsgaard’s objection if  their views of  
action and rationality measure agents’ actual desires differently. What 
determines what the agent does should be the motivational forces that 
desires produce in the agent at the moment when she decides to act. That is 
when her desires play their causal role in determining action. What 
determines what it is rational to do should be the agent’s dispositional desire 
strengths. Our normative intuitions about rationality concern these states. 
Since the action that desire motivates us most strongly to do at the moment 
of  action may not be the action that would best satisfy our dispositional 
desires, irrational action is possible. This way of  filling out the double-
Humean view is true to the best reasons for accepting both of  the theses that 
compose it, and lets us better understand the nature of  irrational action. 
 
1. The Double-Humean View 
 
Humeans about motivation hold that desire is necessary for motivation, 
while Humeans about reasons hold that our reasons for action are grounded 
in our desires. These theories have not always been elaborated so as to clearly 
answer questions about which action someone will perform or which action 
it is rational to perform. I will elaborate Humean theories about motivation 
and reasons in a way that answers these questions, as doing so helps to 
display the force of  Korsgaard’s objection.  
According to the Humean theory of  motivation, the only states of  mind 
necessary for motivating action are a desire and a belief  that an action will 
bring about the desired state.2 This is a nonnormative theory describing the 
                                                
1 Christine Korsgaard, “The Normativity of  Instrumental Reason,” in G. Cullity and B. 
Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
2 For similar formulations of  the Humean theory of  motivation, see: Michael Smith, The 
Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Ralph Wedgwood, “Practical Reason and Desire,” 
Australasian Journal of  Philosophy 80 (2002): 345-58; Neil Sinhababu, “The Humean Theory of  
Motivation Reformulated and Defended,” Philosophical Review 118 (2009): 465-500.  
I 
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psychological states that cause action. If  we add up the motivational forces 
favoring or disfavoring each action, each force being the product of  a desire 
with a particular strength and a belief  about how acting will affect the 
probability of  desire satisfaction, we arrive at the following theory about 
what agents will do: 
 
Humean theory of  action: Agents do whatever maximizes expected desire 
satisfaction.3 
 
The notion of  “expected desire satisfaction” here is familiar from decision 
theory, and can be characterized as a subjective-probability-weighted average 
of  the extent to which various outcomes would satisfy the agent’s desires. 
According to the Humean theory of  practical reason, agents have 
reason to act insofar as the action promotes the satisfaction of  their desires.4 
This is a normative theory in which reasons give actions pro tanto justification. 
Weighing and adding up the reasons as we previously did with the 
motivational forces, in terms of  desire strengths and changes in probabilities 
of  desire satisfaction, we can produce the following theory about what it is 
rational for agents to do: 
 
Humean theory of  rationality: It is rational for agents to do whatever maximizes 
expected desire satisfaction. 
 
Henceforth I will take double-Humeans to be committed to the conjunction 
of  the Humean theory of  action and the Humean theory of  rationality. I beg 
the indulgence of  readers who see better options for Humeans regarding 
what agents will do and which action is rational, as my purpose in developing 
Humean views on these two questions is mainly to demonstrate the force of  
Korsgaard’s objection. As long as one’s answer to “What will agents do?” is 
the same as “What is it rational for agents to do?” – as is the case with the 
two Humean theories laid out above – the objection will apply. 
 
2. Korsgaard’s Objection 
 
Korsgaard provides an instance of  a general argument against accepting 
accounts of  motivation and rationality as neatly matched as the two 
                                                
3 This and the next formulation treat inaction as a way of  doing something. 
4 For similar formulations of  the Humean theory of  rationality, see: Smith 1994; Wedgwood 
2002; Mark Schroeder, Slaves of  the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). I 
formulate both Humean theories in terms of  “expected desire satisfaction” rather than 
“what would maximize desire satisfaction if  the agent’s beliefs were true,” to better handle 
cases where (for example) one pays $1 for a 1 percent chance of  getting $500. Expected 
value formulations rightly present this gamble as rational. But formulations involving the 
truth of  one’s beliefs might not present the gamble as rational, since one does not believe 
that one will get $500. 
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components of  the double-Humean view. She objects that such accounts 
make practical irrationality impossible: 
 
The problem is coming from the fact that Hume identifies a person’s end as what he 
wants most, and the criterion of  what the person wants most appears to be what he 
actually does. The person’s ends are taken to be revealed in his conduct. If  we don’t 
make a distinction between what a person’s end is and what he actually pursues, it will 
be impossible to find a case in which he violates the instrumental principle (1997: 230). 
 
Korsgaard spells out the “instrumental principle” as follows in a later work: 
“[P]ractical rationality requires us to take the means to our ends.”5 She adds 
that “some philosophers regard the ends in question as things desired” (2008: 
5). This group would seem to include Hume and contemporary Humeans 
about reasons. One might understand the Humean theory of  rationality as an 
elaboration of  the instrumental principle that delivers precise answers as to 
which action is rational.6 Treating the performance of  an action as a means 
to satisfying our desires, an account of  rationality based on the instrumental 
principle would present the action that provides the greatest expected desire 
satisfaction as the rational one. 
Korsgaard’s objection to the double-Humean view is that it makes 
practical irrationality impossible by giving matching accounts of  rationality 
and motivation. If  a theory of  motivation says that one will perform a 
particular action, and a theory of  rationality says that it is rational for one to 
perform that action, the conjunction of  the theories will imply that one acts 
rationally. According to Korsgaard, Hume not only says that “people don’t in 
fact ever violate the instrumental principle. He is actually committed to the 
view that people cannot violate it” (1997: 228). To avoid this consequence, 
we might reject at least one component of  the double-Humean view. 
The sort of  practical irrationality the double-Humean needs to explain is 
not merely a matter of  doing the wrong thing because of  false belief, like 
drinking gasoline because you mistakenly believe that it is gin.7 In these cases, 
we might say that there was a reason for you to do otherwise, but that by 
itself  does not make you irrational. As Korsgaard says, “the possibility of  
mistake is not in general very interesting” (1997: 227). She explains why in an 
earlier paper: “judgments of  irrationality, whether of  belief  or action, are, 
strictly speaking, relative to the subject’s beliefs. Conclusions drawn from 
                                                
5 Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of  Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 
5. 
6 As stated, the instrumental principle does not tell us how we ought to choose between two 
incompatible ends, or how to incorporate differing subjective probabilities of  satisfaction. 
The Humean theory of  rationality answers these questions. 
7 Humeans about rationality are well positioned to explain how agents can do things they 
lack reasons to do because of  mistaken belief. This is different from accounting for 
irrationality. See David Sobel, “Subjective Accounts of  Reasons for Action,” Ethics 111 
(2001): 461-92, which deals with mistaken belief  in a comprehensive way. 
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mistaken premises are not irrational.”8 One need not develop the double-
Humean view in any especially sophisticated way in order to account for the 
failure to do what there is most reason for you to do, at least when we are 
talking about the kind of  reasons that are tied to actual (and not expected) 
desire satisfaction. 
The trouble is to account for the sort of  failure to act rationally that can 
occur even when the agent has no relevant false beliefs. Korsgaard offers an 
example: 
 
Howard, who is in his thirties, needs medical treatment: specifically, he must have a 
course of  injections, now, if  he is going to live past fifty. But Howard declines to have 
this treatment, because he has a horror of  injections. Let me just stipulate that, were it 
not for his horror of  injections, Howard would have the treatment. It’s not that he 
really secretly wants to die young anyway, or anything fancy like that. Howard’s horror 
of  injections is really what is motivating him. … [L]et’s again stipulate that he has not 
miscalculated or made a mistake. He sees that, if  he were governed by considerations 
of  prudence, he would have the injections: he agrees that a long and happy life is a 
greater good than avoiding the injections. But he still declines to have them: he 
chooses “his own acknowledg’d lesser good” (1997: 227). 
 
Howard knows the consequences of  his actions, even as he rejects the 
injections that will save his life. In refusing the injections, Howard acts 
irrationally. If  double-Humeans cannot account for his irrationality or the 
irrational behavior of  agents in so many similar cases, their theory will be 
deeply implausible. The rest of  this paper will develop both sides of  the 
double-Humean theory so as to account for the irrationality of  Howard and 
people like him. 
 
3. The Humean Theory of  Action and Immediate Motivational Forces 
 
In filling out the Humean theory of  action, we should bear in mind how the 
motivational force our desires produce can vary. For example, a desire’s 
motivational force can be amplified by vivid sensory or imaginative 
representations of  its object. So when we are determining what the agent will 
do in a given situation, we should look at the motivational forces her desires 
produce after the vividness of  these representations has affected them. 
Hume’s psychological insights help us develop the theories that he 
inspired about motivation and action. After distinguishing between calm and 
violent passions, he describes how vivid images of  desired objects affect an 
agent’s motivational states. He notes that by “varying the situation of  the 
object” we can “change the calm and violent passions into one another” 
(2.3.4).9 For example, one can change a calm passion into a violent one by 
                                                
8 Christine Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” Journal of  Philosophy 83 (1986): 5-
25. 
9 David Hume, A Treatise of  Human Nature, 2nd edition, L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 
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bringing its object closer to the agent. Hume explains why “The same good, 
when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a 
calm one” (2.3.4) – because we imagine nearby goods more vividly: 
 
There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to us, either in space or time, 
shou’d be conceiv’d with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object, in 
its influence on the imagination. Ourself  is intimately present to us, and whatever is 
related to self  must partake of  that quality. But where an object is so far remov’d as to 
have lost the advantage of  this relation ... its idea becomes still fainter and more 
obscure (2:2:7). 
 
The closer something is to us in space or time, the more vividly we will 
imagine it, and the more violent our passions for it will be. An increase in 
violence consists in a magnification of  the passion’s effects, including its 
motivational force as well as its felt emotional intensity.10 Hume explains our 
tendency to discount future goods in terms of  the greater motivational force 
produced by our more violent passions for nearby goods, which he explains 
in terms of  their greater imaginative vividness. 
Vivid sensory or imaginative representations will increase the violence 
of  a desire. Because of  this, the motivational force a desire can produce may 
vary dramatically over time, even without any permanent changes in the 
agent’s psychological dispositions.11 My desire for a chocolaty dessert may 
increase in violence as I see the delicious thing brought out on the dessert 
tray. My desire to lie around in bed is more violent when I feel the physical 
comforts of  my warm bed all around me than it is after I rise. Howard, in 
Korsgaard’s case, likely imagines the injections (which as Hume would note, 
are nearer to him in space and time) much more vividly than the distant 
benefits of  being a happy 60-year-old, and his aversion to the injections thus 
becomes violent. 
When agents are presented with unequally vivid representations of  the 
objects of  their desires, they may act irrationally. Perhaps my desire for 
chocolate, intensified by the sight of  the delicious dessert, will cause me to 
eat it, even though it wrecks my diet. When I lie too long in bed, the 
comforts of  bed are much more vivid to me than the benefits of  getting 
work done that day. Howard, with his aversion to injections intensified by his 
                                                                                                                     
eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). 
10 Calm passions can still overpower violent passions and determine action. The motivational 
strength of  a passion will rise when it becomes violent, but may still remain below that of  a 
much stronger passion that remains calm. Then the calm passion can overpower the violent 
passion. This is what happens in resolute action. 
11 I invoke immediate motivational force rather than simply using the occurrent/dispositional 
distinction and talking about the “occurrent strength” of  desire because desire has many 
functional outputs (motivating action, producing pleasure and displeasure, and directing 
attention), some of  which are more affected than others by vivid representations. Thus I 
cannot appeal to a unified notion of  “occurrent strength” covering all these outputs. See 
Sinhababu 2009 for more discussion of  how vivid representations affect desire. 
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proximity to them, has greater motivation to pursue what he acknowledges as 
his lesser good. In these cases, the benefits of  irrational action are presented 
more vividly than the costs, so agents’ desires for the benefits flare up out of  
proportion to their desires to avoid the costs. This makes the agents act 
irrationally and incur costs that they would have avoided if  they had 
considered everything with equally vividness.  
Filling out the Humean theory of  action so that “desire” is understood 
as “desire, accounting for the motivational effects of  the agent’s sensory or 
imaginative representations” is true to the theoretical grounds for the view. 
Whether because of  the teleological structure of  action explanations or in 
pursuit of  the best explanation of  how we think and feel as we deliberate and 
act, Humeans about motivation hold that desire is necessary for action, and 
that belief  is insufficient. The proposed elaboration of  the Humean theory 
of  motivation into a view about which action we perform is true to both the 
letter and the spirit of  this principle. Desire operates in a way that falls 
squarely within the Humean theory of  motivation, and the states that 
intensify desire – vivid sensory or imaginative representations of  its objects – 
are not beliefs.  
 
4. The Humean Theory of  Rationality and Dispositional Desire 
Strengths 
 
Now I will consider the appropriate conception of  desire strengths for the 
Humean theory of  rationality. The right conception is not that of  the 
motivational force that desires are producing at the moment of  action, which 
can be heavily affected by what agents perceive or imagine at the time. 
Instead, “desire” in the Humean theory of  rationality should refer to the 
agents’ dispositional desires. Dispositional desire strengths provide a baseline 
to which vivid images of  the objects add in generating the immediate 
motivational force of  the desires. Humeans about rationality should use this 
antecedent dispositional baseline, and not the balance of  motivational forces 
at the moment of  action, to determine what it is rational to do.  
Dispositional mental properties have been the subject of  much work in 
the philosophy of  mind.12 They are a fundamental part of  our ordinary 
mental-state attributions. For example, we can say that Aisling desires Ireland 
to be free more than she desires any amount of  money, even if  she is busy 
minding her store and not thinking about Irish freedom. Even when she is in 
                                                
12 For a classic treatment of  mental dispositions in philosophical psychology, see Gilbert 
Ryle, The Concept of  Mind (London: Hutcheson, 1949). Views opposed to Ryle’s, like those in 
D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 
will allow my argument to go forward as long as they allow both for occurrent desires and 
stable non-occurrent desires of  some sort. To see the notion of  dispositional desire put to 
good use, see David Boonin, A Defense of  Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
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a dreamless sleep, with no occurrent mental states at all, we can say that she 
desires the freedom of  Ireland more than money. Her dispositional desire 
strengths make the claim true. Other mental states, including belief, operate 
similarly. We can ascribe beliefs concerning political matters to her when she 
is asleep or busy with other things. In doing so, we ascribe dispositional 
beliefs. 
While an agent whose dispositional desire for A is stronger than her 
dispositional desire for B will usually be disposed to choose A over B, this 
will not always be the case. We should not confuse having a stronger 
dispositional desire for A than for B with a disposition to choose A in all 
circumstances. In some circumstances, vivid representations of  B may 
amplify the force of  the desire for B, but not that of  the desire for A, leading 
the agent to pursue B rather than A. Ordinary desire attributions take this 
into account. As someone trying to quit smoking is asleep, we might say, “He 
wants to quit more than he wants to keep smoking. That’s what he says when 
you ask him, and it’s why he stays away from smoky places. As he knows, the 
smoky air will inflame his desire for another cigarette, and then he’ll smoke 
again.” A good psychological model for this kind of  behavior would attribute 
to the smoker a stronger dispositional desire to quit than to smoke, and then 
allow vivid sensory representations of  cigarette smoke to amplify the 
motivational force of  the desire to smoke. This would explain both why he 
would smoke in a smoky environment, and why, knowing this, he chooses to 
stay away from smoky places. An interesting feature of  this desire attribution 
is that while the smoker is in some sense more disposed to smoke than to 
abstain when in smoky places, we still treat his desire to abstain as the 
stronger dispositional desire. Ordinary mental-state attributions thus seem to 
distinguish dispositional desires from overall dispositions to perform some 
action. 
While it is hard to give a good philosophical account of  dispositional 
mental states, because of  difficulties with properly spelling out the conditions 
under which they manifest and because of  the conditional fallacy, the notion 
of  dispositional desire is an important part of  ordinary folk psychology.13 
Describing the sleeping person as wanting to quit more than he wants to 
smoke is a fully intelligible desire attribution, even when we add that being in 
a smoky place might make him decide to smoke. We often make similar 
desire attributions about dear but distant friends, talking about what they 
want most while being unaware of  what they are immediately motivated to 
do at the moment. We can do so while being fully aware that vivid 
representations of  other things they desire (or other situational factors) 
might lead them to pursue these other things instead. Humeans about 
                                                
13 For a discussion of  the conditional fallacy, see R. K. Shope, “The Conditional Fallacy in 
Contemporary Philosophy,” Journal of  Philosophy 75 (1978): 397-413; and C. B. Martin, 
“Dispositions and Conditionals,” The Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 1-8. 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 6, NO. 1 
THE HUMEAN THEORY OF PRACTICAL IRRATIONALITY  
Neil Sinhababu 
 
 8 
rationality should invoke the desire strengths being compared in such cases. 
Those who would object that there is something problematic about the very 
notion of  such dispositional desire strengths run the risk of  treating some of  
our ordinary folk-psychological talk as nonsense. 
Dispositional desire strengths allow us to build good explanations of  
motivation, justifying us in positing them as real psychological entities. 
Consider the previously offered cases where vivid representations of  
chocolate, warmth, injections and smoking increase the motivational force of  
desires for or against them. Each case involves vivid representations 
increasing the motivational force of  desire beyond a pre-existing baseline. 
This baseline is the dispositional strength of  the desire. To put the point 
more generally, how an agent is motivated is explained by factors including 
(1) the agent’s means-end beliefs, (2) what is vividly represented and (3) some 
fixed mental characteristic of  the agent that explains why vivid 
representations and means-end beliefs concerning some things have 
motivational effects. On a Humean view, dispositional desire strengths are 
this third factor. Information about how to meet old friends would move me; 
information about how to acquire chewing gum would move me less; 
information about how to acquire Styrofoam would not move me at all. The 
strengths of  my dispositional desires concerning these things explain these 
counterfactuals. We should say that dispositional desire strengths remain 
stable as means-end beliefs and vivid images come and go, since the 
counterfactuals they support about the motivational effects of  various 
means-end beliefs and vivid images are stable. Even if  I am currently seeking 
chewing gum, I would abandon this pursuit if  I believed that doing so would 
allow me to meet a long-lost friend. If  dispositional desires explain how 
strongly various things motivate us, we have reason to think they are real, and 
we may invoke them in psychological and normative theories. 
Dispositional desire strength is superior to the immediate motivational 
force created by desire in fitting our intuitions about rational action. Changes 
in our situation that leave our relevant beliefs and the dispositional strengths 
of  our desires constant while changing the immediate motivational force that 
our desires produce do not generally change our reasons for doing various 
things. The recovering smoker is more motivated to smoke when placed in a 
smoky bar than he is when jogging, but this does not mean he has greater 
reason to smoke. Intuitively, he has just as little reason to smoke, even as his 
motivation increases. While it may be more understandable for him to smoke 
when stuck in a bar than suddenly to veer into a store while jogging, buy 
cigarettes and smoke them, this just means that it is a form of  irrationality 
that better fits our understanding of  how people’s motivations change with 
the circumstances. 
Here I am just defining the “right answer” – the rational thing to do – as 
the option that will maximize expected dispositional desire satisfaction. I am 
not laying out a decision procedure constitutive of  rational deliberation, or 
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claiming that any particular mental events of  sensory or imaginative 
representation must figure in deliberation for one to act rationally.14 One can 
act rationally after representing all options vividly or representing all options 
nonvividly. One can even act rationally when representing the object of  one’s 
weaker dispositional desire more vividly than the object of  one’s stronger 
dispositional desire, as long as the stronger dispositional desire wins. (Perhaps 
in these cases one could be described as irrationally reluctant to pursue one’s 
greater good. All I claim is that the action would be rational.) There may also 
be ways to miss out on maximal expected dispositional desire satisfaction, 
and thus be practically irrational, without any difference in the vividness of  
representations. Depression may prevent someone from acting on her 
strongest dispositional desire. Perhaps in some cases of  impulsive action, 
weaker dispositional desires motivate action before stronger dispositional 
desires can exert their influence. I focus on unequal vividness because it 
presents us with clear, everyday examples of  how we can fail to maximize 
expected dispositional desire satisfaction. 
Now I hope it is clear how the double-Humean view allows irrational 
action. The Humean theory of  action should say that agents do whatever 
their desires produce the greatest motivation for them to do at the moment 
when they engage in action, while the Humean theory of  rationality should 
say that rational actions are those that maximize expected satisfaction of  the 
agent’s desires construed dispositionally, while irrational actions fail to do so. 
Since more vividly representing the object of  a weaker dispositional desire 
may bring it about that the strongest dispositional desire does not exert the 
greatest motivational force, agents can act irrationally. 
This double-Humean view accords with our pretheoretical judgments 
about how common rational action is. It accounts for the truth of  our 
pretheoretical belief  that people act irrationally only in a minority of  cases, 
since the mental states that justify action – dispositional desires and means-
end beliefs – play a substantial role in explaining it. Our dispositional desire 
strengths are a large factor in determining the immediate motivational force 
produced by our desires as we act, so there is reason to expect our actions to 
maximize expected dispositional desire satisfaction most of  the time. But 
there is room for irrationality – for example, when we have unequally vivid 
images of  the objects of  desire, making a weaker desire especially violent and 
thus more motivationally forceful than its dispositional strength would 
suggest. Thus the double-Humean view explains why people usually, though 
not always, act rationally.  
 
                                                
14 For impressive arguments that even akratic agents can act rationally, see Nomy Arpaly, 
Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
Arpaly’s arguments incline me to think that no particular decision procedure is necessary for 
rational action. 
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5. The Spirit of  the Humean Theory of  Rationality 
 
Korsgaard seems to hold that proposals like mine are not true to the spirit of  
the Humean theory of  rationality. Her objection to such proposals seems to 
be that the reasons for accepting the theory prevent its defenders from 
distinguishing the rational action from the one we actually do. I concede that 
double-Humeans will no longer be able to use a traditional argument for 
their view of  rationality, which grounds rationality in motivational force, if  
they do as I suggest. But this argument does not capture what is really 
appealing about the Humean theory of  rationality, and defenders of  the 
theory can happily set it aside. 
Korsgaard writes that “the problem would be solved if  we could make a 
distinction between a person’s ends and what he actually pursues” and 
suggests two ways to do this (1997: 230). The first is to “make a distinction 
between actual desire and rational desire, and say that a person’s ends are not 
merely what he wants, but what he has reason to want” (ibid). Korsgaard is 
right that specifying what one has reason to desire and what one does not 
have reason to desire would bring in additional principles that would violate 
the spirit of  the Humean theory of  rationality. As David Sobel writes, “If  
someone added to instrumentalism an account of  an agent’s true ends such 
that necessarily all agents had the end of  being moral, then the distinctive 
traditional subjectivism of  instrumentalism would be lost” (2001: 486). My 
solution incorporates no additional principles distinguishing rational and 
irrational desire, preserving the subjectivism that is essential to the Humean 
theory of  rationality and escaping this objection. 
The second way she describes includes my proposal: “[W]e could make 
a more psychological distinction between what a person thinks he wants or 
locally wants and what he ‘really wants.’” While the question of  what 
someone “thinks he wants” plays no role in my proposal, one could describe 
the distinction I am using as between what someone “locally wants” and 
what he wants in a nonlocalized way. According to Korsgaard, this second 
proposal is not available to double-Humeans. It “takes us beyond 
instrumental rationality, although this may not be immediately obvious” 
(1997: 230). This is because: 
 
If  we are going to appeal to ‘‘real’’ desires as a basis for making claims about whether 
people are acting rationally or not, we will have to argue that a person ought to pursue 
what he really wants rather than what he is in fact going to pursue. That is, we will have 
to accord these ‘‘real’’ desires some normative force. It must be something like a 
requirement of  reason that you should do what you ‘‘really want,’’ even when you are 
tempted not to. And then, again, we will have gone beyond instrumental rationality 
after all [ibid].15 
                                                
15 The phrase “what you ‘really want’” is not good for picking out dispositional desires in 
contrast to the immediate motivational force that they produce. “Really want” seems to be 
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Korsgaard’s objection to this move seems to be that it requires us to attribute 
some normative force to psychological states that are unsuccessful in causing 
action, while withholding the same force to the psychological states that 
actually cause action. My solution does this. But it is not clear why it takes us 
beyond the Humean theory of  rationality, which demands that we treat 
rationality as a matter of  maximizing expected desire satisfaction. What 
prevents “desire satisfaction” here from being the satisfaction of  
dispositional desires? Korsgaard seems to think that Humeans are required to 
identify the rational action with the one actually performed. But why should 
any Humean have this commitment? 
Humeans may incur this commitment if  they rely on what Mark 
Schroeder calls the Classical Argument, which adds existence internalism 
about reasons to the Humean theory of  motivation to get the Humean 
theory of  practical reason. As Schroeder summarizes the argument, “If  
having a reason requires motivation, and motivation requires a desire, then 
having a reason requires having a desire” (2007: 7).16 Korsgaard presents a 
version of  this argument as her opponents’ reason for rejecting categorical 
imperatives: “Since the idea of  being motivated by belief  alone seems 
mysterious, the suspicion arises that categorical imperatives cannot meet the 
internalism requirement, and they are supposed to be especially problematic” 
(1997: 220). While Schroeder’s version of  the Classical Argument concerns 
what it is to have a reason and not which action is rational, it can be 
straightforwardly extended to deliver a Humean account of  rationality. If  (1) 
its being rational to do something requires that one be most motivated to do 
it, and (2) being most motivated to do something requires that one desire it 
most, then (3) it will always be rational to do what one desires most. 
The first premise of  this argument, which could be called 
rationality/motivation existence internalism,17 forces Humeans to identify 
rationality with motivation, much as Korsgaard says. It leaves them unable to 
explain irrationality. If  one always does what one is most motivated to do – 
and it is unclear what else being most motivated could mean – 
rationality/motivation existence internalism will imply that one cannot fail to 
act rationally. When we loosen the tie between rationality and motivation by 
grounding rationality in dispositional desires, we deny the first premise of  the 
Classical Argument for the Humean theory of  rationality.18 But if  we reject 
                                                                                                                     
ambiguous between the entities on both sides of  the distinction. If  there is a sense in which 
I do not really want the chocolaty dessert that I know will wreck my diet, surely there is 
another sense in which I do. 
16 Also see Wedgwood 2002 for criticism of  this argument. 
17 This would follow and extend the terminology in Stephen Darwall, “Reasons, Motives, and 
the Demands of  Morality: An Introduction,” in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard and Peter 
Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
18 For the most influential paper incorporating a version of  the Classical Argument, see 
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this argument, do we have any reason to accept this theory? If  not, 
Korsgaard will be right that the Humean theory of  rationality cannot be 
grounded in mental states that fail to produce action, on pain of  giving up 
the reason to accept it. 
Fortunately, better arguments are available to Humeans about rationality. 
As Schroeder writes, “I don’t think that the Classical Argument is a 
particularly good argument for the Humean Theory of  Reasons, and I 
certainly don’t think that it is what really gives the Humean theory its deep 
philosophical appeal” (7). He argues for the Humean Theory of  Reasons on 
the grounds that it provides a reduction of  the norms of  practical rationality 
that fits our intuitions about these norms, setting aside cases in which our 
intuitions are likely to be unreliable. In particular, it accounts for our 
intuitions about “why it is that some reasons are reasons for everyone, while 
other are reasons for only some” (212). Using dispositional desires to 
determine what reasons we have would preserve this attractive feature of  the 
theory, and the corresponding Humean view about rationality should be 
correspondingly attractive. 
It is beyond the scope of  this paper to argue that the Humean theory of  
rationality best accounts for our intuitions, or to examine the arguments that 
others have offered. But it is within the scope of  this paper to call attention 
to this way of  defending it, urge double-Humeans to argue for it on these 
grounds and suggest that they respond to Korsgaard by setting the Classical 
Argument aside.19 This advice is continuous with the argument for 
formulating the Humean theory of  rationality so that it concerns 
dispositional desires rather than immediate motivational forces. This 
formulation better fits our intuitions about rationality. It need not coincide 
with the way actions are motivated. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Korsgaard criticizes “a theory very fashionable in the social scientific and 
economic literature, sometimes called the self-interest or economic theory of  
rationality” according to which “it is rational for each person to pursue his 
overall good: to act on some variant of  the principle of  prudence” (1997: 
                                                                                                                     
Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). As Williams distinguishes what we are motivated to do 
from what we might be motivated to do if  we deliberated well, he still might be able to make 
room for irrationality. 
19 For another reading of  Korsgaard’s argument, see Stephanie Beardman, “The Special 
Status of  Instrumental Reasons,” Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 255-87. Beardman’s reading 
has Korsgaard attributing an excessively strict principle of  constitutiveness to her opponents. 
My version of  the Humean theory of  rationality escapes this version of  Korsgaard’s 
objection as well, as it does not rely on the problematic principle that Beardman presents. 
Beardman’s point that “the structure of  desire and related states, in a realistic psychology, 
will allow for the complexities of  human perversity” is one that this paper develops in detail. 
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230). Here I agree with her. Economists are often less careful than 
philosophers about untangling normative and descriptive issues. 
Furthermore, their models of  how people plan for the future often ignore 
the psychological point that things sensed or imagined more vividly will 
increase the violence of  our passions and be pursued with greater vigor.20 
Where they insist on these models, they may be subject to Korsgaard’s 
criticism, and cannot use the response that I have offered to double-
Humeans. One hopes that the increasing popularity of  psychologically 
informed economics will lead to more sophisticated models of  the mental 
states involved in action. 
Philosophers inclined towards the double-Humean view, however, need 
not wait on these developments. We are already in position to develop 
broadly desire-based accounts of  action and practical rationality that leave 
room for irrational action. We can use the immediate motivational force 
produced by desires at the moment of  action to determine what an agent will 
do, and use dispositional desires to determine what an agent ought to do. 
This will require reconceiving the reasons for accepting the Humean theory 
of  rationality: rather than defending the view on the basis of  the Classical 
Argument, we should argue that it best accounts for our intuitions about 
practical rationality. If  these arguments are successful, we will be left with 
theories of  action and rationality that account for just as much irrationality as 
there is. 
 
Neil Sinhababu* 
National University of  Singapore 
Department of  Philosophy 
neiladri@gmail.com 
                                                
20 The Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis is one influential position in economics that would 
be imperiled by more attention to the way that vivid images increase the violence of  our 
passions. Defenders of  Ricardian Equivalence hold that governments cannot successfully 
stimulate the economy through deficit spending, because instead of  spending their stimulus 
money as intended, people will save all of  it to defray future taxes that will be levied to make 
up the deficits. But if  we assume that people have more violent passions for nearby things, 
since they have more vivid images of  these things, we can see why they will stimulate the 
economy by spending money, even at the expense of  their future security. The goods they 
achieve by saving are further away and less vividly represented, producing less violent 
passions; while the goods they achieve by spending are nearer and more vividly represented, 
producing more violent passions that will have greater influence in driving their behavior. 
For an influential defense of  Ricardian Equivalence, see Robert Barro, “Are Government 
Bonds Net Wealth?” The Journal of  Political Economy 82:6 (1974): 1095-1117. 
* This paper was greatly improved by feedback from audiences at the 2008 AAP conference, 
the University of Southern California, the University of Miami, the University of Illinois, 
Oriel College Oxford and the University of Michigan. In particular, I would like to thank 
David Dick and Mike Titelbaum for getting me to think about the issue, and Michael Smith, 
Mark Schroeder, Rachael Briggs, Kenny Easwaran, Ben Blumson and Nick Stang for helpful 
comments. 
